A coherent European left must move beyond three false dilemmas and propose a positive alternative By Michal Sutowski, Krytyka Polityczna Translated from Polish by Karolina Walęcik The European left has been in a state of crisis for at least three decades. Many factors, economic and socio-cultural, give rise to that; Post-Fordism and the transition into a “fluid” phase of capitalism; the functionalisation of the emancipation ideals of the 1968 revolution through a system based on hedonism and individual consumption; the Postmodern ideology; deconstruction of the welfare state; and finally, the collapse of real socialism in the Eastern Block. In my opinion, at least three fundamental political dilemmas – basic oppositions which determined the framework of the left-wing thought at the beginning of the 21st century – are wrongly defined, constituting the main source of the problem. The first dilemma is one of the scale of action, the dilemma between cosmopolitanism and nationalism. The opponents of the current globalization model can be divided into two groups. On the one hand, there are the “sovereigntists” or anti-globalists, whose strategy is based on defending societies, economies and communities from the destructive influence of capital flow, by means of strengthening the nation state and protectionism. As regards Europe, they are often against the development of European integration. On the other hand, we have the supporters of a cosmopolitan global government that would coordinate successive levels of management and regulate economic flow, thereby constituting that great community called Humankind. Both solutions are dead ends. The first does not acknowledge the asymmetry of forces between big corporations and national governments. Furthermore, it does not recognize the phenomenon of Standortkonkurrenz [competition between different localities] which is conducive to capital outflow to countries whose governments allow for lower taxes and social standards. The second solution would require structures and institutions of unimaginable size (just how many envoys would a genuinely democratic world parliament amount to?); but most of all it is based on universalist, highly Eurocentric assumptions, particularly applicable to those philosophical principles of law which would be valid in “the global republic,” but also required by such a community of political cultures. It is not easy to dismiss the accusation that such a solution would simply become a new model of Western political and cultural colonialism, difficult for the rest of the world to accept. Another prevailing opposition concerns the attitude towards the broadly understood “system”: between supporters of the swing to the centre and access to the mainstream (i.e. Giddens’/Blair’s/Schröder’s Third Way), and the radical resistance and dismantling of the system from “the outside.” The first side of that conflict finds its justification in Fukuyama’s “historical necessity acknowledgement,” which leads directly to the acceptance of neoliberalism. At the same time it supports the right-wing concept of transferring the basic political conflict from economy to culture. The Left may be permitted to fight for the rights of gays (women, children, immigrants, etc.) with the Right, but the released capital revels in the background undisturbed. The fight for acknowledgement replaces (instead of complementing) the fight for redistribution, whilst the lack of a left-wing alternative for the socially excluded pushes them into the arms of conservative populists (Haider, Le Pen). On the other side, anti-system radicalism allows the rebels to retain their ideological virtue untainted by contact with the mainstream media, current politics or political institutions. However, as Slavoj Žižek rightly points out, the capitalist system constitutes its own “Outside”, into which its critics are readily appropriated. The followers of the radical split, passing an alleged judgment from “the outside”, perfectly sustain and legitimize the status quo. They do so in various ways: as another economic niche (labeled “radical revolt”), in the recognition of pluralism (“hey, look at our freedom of speech, even for freaks such as these!”), or, in the extreme case, by constructing an Other-enemy exiled from the social and symbolic structure of liberal community (“enemy combatant” in Guantanamo). The third dilemma concerns the subject of change – who are “the Wretched of the Earth?” Either there is “an objective collective interest” of some class, subclass or proletariat, whether conscious or not, or there are only separate groups of interest – the handicapped, for example, or subjects of discrimination. One side of the dilemma says that they can lead their own “micro-fights” (separately gays, feminists, workers in junk-jobs) but they will not make up one political movement. The other side of the dilemma thinks it possible that the multitudes created by fluid capitalism and propelled by some “invisible hand” could overthrow the system harmoniously and without any intentional coordination. But both solutions would lead us astray. The systems of hierarchy, exploitation, domination and discrimination are much more complex than a simple class division. Contrary to what was the case in the 19th century, there are now very narrow elites, a broader middle-class (if threatened with pauperization), and a “superfluous” subclass, along with many unsolved identity issues. Individual and group interests are not “objectively” concurrent, whilst their sources of oppression are not necessarily identical. Separate “micro-fights” will prove ineffective, as particular tactics are often contradictory. Many wealthy Polish gays, for example, voted for the conservative-liberal party because lower taxes would allow them to move out to a more secure neighborhood. Their erotic pursuits, meanwhile, can then be conducted in nightclubs customarily avoided by the conservative population. Criticism has always been a strong point of the Left, but rarely has it taken a positive standpoint. One should ask not what is wrong, but, as Tchernischevsky said (and Lenin followed him), “What Is to Be Done?” In looking back at the first of the aforementioned dilemmas, perhaps the only trustworthy solution is for democratic regional block construction. Of course, I do not mean NAFTA, but rather the South-American MERCOSUR and the European Union. Obviously, their current drawbacks and deficiencies are evident (lack of political coherence, tax and social policy determined at state level, and in particular the huge democracy deficit). Still, these are the strong regional structures which would stand a chance of organizing the world on a large scale, whereby the position of peripheral territories would be strengthened, whilst modernization would not have to mean Westernization. For example, a network variant of the welfare state (similar to the Finnish) could perhaps be adapted at a European level, but would be hardly conceivable as a global model. Therefore, other regions would have to develop different ways to control markets and redistribution. When it comes to human rights, the regional blocks model would be more conducive to pluralisation and contextualization than today’s universalism and uniformity of the Western pattern. Lastly, the existence of a few such possibilities is conducive to a more democratic development of global regulations than it is in a unilateral world. The European idea of soft-power (I dare say our most precious contribution to the global order) would take roots more easily in the global Polyarchy. In surpassing another “false” opposition – either entrance into or rejection of the mainstream – we begin to “shift mainstream.” Whilst staying within the framework of liberal democracy, we ought to restore the concept of politics as a sphere of agon and not consensus. Secondly, we ought to change (that is shift to the left) the scope of what can be uttered in the public sphere with legal validity, meaning that there ought not to be any pressure on us to simply enliven political debate with opinionated tomfoolery. What is required is presence in mass-media, the construction of a network of associations, and the credible symbolism of a political project. The Left has to appear in the media – not as provocateur, but as representative of a coherent political vision, backed with academic, cultural and pop-cultural background. As Gramsci observed, the political sphere is won over by the winning over of the cultural. Answering the question about the subject of change it can be said that the role of politics is to properly determine who are “the Wretched of the Earth.” Different interests are not objectively convergent and proper contextualization and definition can help find the missing links between them, or “the logic of equivalence” in Chantal Mouffe’s words. The suffering, impairment and lowered self-esteem of individuals and groups cannot be reduced to one conflict. The intellectual and practical task of the Left should be to offer them a common political dimension. Crises have always been a threat, but also a chance for the Left. 1929 bore the fruit of the welfare state in the US. The same outcome in Europe was imposed by Stalin’s tanks on the Elbe. Perhaps the current collapse of financial markets will help to end the end of history that offers as the only choice hedonist American capitalism or slavish Chinese capitalism. What do we get in return? To travesty a sentence perhaps never uttered by Marx (despite what Sorel hoped): even the mere thought about that is reactionary. We shall see.