(Photo: See Wah/Flickr) In response to: Burqa: between judgments and prejudices, by Valeria Venturini By Andrea Glioti* At first sight, the French ban on the wearing of full Islamic covering – the niqab as well as the burqa – in official public spaces resembles the 90’s quarrel on the hijab, at least for the implied intentions to emancipate Muslim women. However, this time there is more at stake than women’s supposed subjugation and French laicїte`: the use of niqab sparks off a debate on its compatibility with integration, since a facial veil could be reasonably deemed responsible for social isolation. Forget about human rights in the Middle East, it is not about a “crusade” on the whole Muslim world to stop integral veiling, the context is a European society where different standards have to be applied to facilitate mutual understanding between migrants and pre-existing communities. Forget also about security issues, although allowing someone to be fully unrecognizable in public spaces is probably equal to walking around in a balaclava. The reasonable doubts on embracing multiculturalist tenets about this matter are to be traced elsewhere: most of those opposing the ban are worried by the disrespect for cultural differences, without even questioning whether the women wearing the niqab (munaqqabat) are willing to be part of this idealised multicultural society. Moreover, the whole debate has been going on prevalently without the munaqqabat participating in it, thus resulting in an overwhelming flow of opinions focusing only on the French proposal. Among the numerous videos uploaded on YouTube by the munaqqabat, the main concerns are to please God and to protect themselves from men’s gazes, although some of them are also convinced to contribute positively to society, without being judged for their physical aspect. Nevertheless, the type of social engagement is quite ambiguous, considered that some munaqqabat strictly adhere to sexual segregation (purdah in Hindi), curtailing every kind of interaction with men outside the family’s boundaries. Regarding this, it should be reminded that the niqab is not a mere religious symbol, but a practice promoted by conservative groups (particularly salafi), firmly hostile to any innovation (bid’ah) in the framework of religious interpretation. These factions have clear stances on promiscuity: “Muslimahs should not socialize with non-mahram (non-relatives) men, and should only speak out of necessity to non-mahram men” is what prescribed by the salafi website Al-Muttaqun. As a general rule, Muslim women are explicitly encouraged not to engage in social conversations with the opposite sex. It is consequential that the munaqqabat willing to integrate themselves should stand up against this segregationist behaviour, otherwise they would be alienated from a society clearly accepting inter-gender relations. Furthermore, the niqab is more related with habits introduced after Islam’s encounter with Persia and the Byzantine civilization, rather than with an Islamic legitimacy: Shaykh Tantawy of the al-Azhar Mosque of Cairo, the highest authority of the Sunni world, clearly uttered his opposition to niqab in 2009, when he defined it as rooted in tradition and devoid of any connection with Islam. Hassen Chalghoumi, imam of the Northern Paris suburb of Drancy, backed the “niqab ban”, claiming that the munaqqabat should migrate to Saudi Arabia where this piece of cloth is a tradition, whereas in France they have no part in society. It is consequently evident how the place of integral veils in Islam cannot be reduced to a “Western crusade” for the emancipation of women: the division on this issue clearly affects firstly the Muslim world. Since the niqab must not be considered a religious symbol, but more the expression of neo-traditionalist groups, how could Europe possibly benefit from encouraging this particular image of Islam? Is a religion more likely to be understood in its distorted forms by those not familiar with it? These are legitimate questions, considered also that the French proposal was drafted by a commission of different political parties and not exclusively by the Islamophobic components. There is no doubt that our “alleged emancipation took the steps of a culture based on calendar and show girls”, but it is not from the contribution of integrally veiled women that we should expect to rescue our moral values. Islam will participate in shaping new European identities, but preferably through a contribution based on its enlightened values, rather than on its traditionalist deadlocks. Reflecting the paradigms of a failing electoral strategy, multiculturalist leftists tend to consider less important the cultural sensitivity of the majority. However, reversing the perspective, the same advocates of the niqab would not bother about defending the rights of a European girl wandering about the streets of Cairo in miniskirt: such a behaviour is reasonably considered offensive in that cultural context. On the other hand, it is not clear why non-Muslims should be compelled to welcome the niqab in Europe, regardless of their cultural sensitivity. Moreover, not being able to see the face of someone during a conversation is considered to degrade significantly human relationships in a wide variety of different cultures (and not only in France). For what concerns the reactions abroad, the British PM Gordon Brown logically criticized French assimilationism. However, the debate on the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal, some teachers reluctant to talk about the Holocaust, because of Muslim sensitivity, and the recent rise of the British National Party (BNP) are only a few examples questioning the superiority of British multiculturalism. The British approach is frequently under revision and sometimes, rather than a model, it is more of a compensation for the UK’s disgraced image in the Islamic world (Iraq war?) by pleasing British Muslims. Arguing that the niqab is chosen by a tiny minority of Muslim women does not prevent anyone from being worried by the perspective of a return of religious fanaticism and sexual segregation, considered all the efforts produced in Europe to fight their Christian versions. This has nothing to do neither with Islam nor with Islamophobic parties, although those opposing the French ban are more worried about not being associated with anti-Islam circles, rather than about the significance of the niqab. Nonetheless, encouraging the niqab will not improve the Western image in the Muslim world, as this is already divided on the matter. Sometimes the best way of defending minority rights is wrongly supposed to be unconditional tolerance: on the contrary, the conditional acceptance in the body of citizens is the main requisite for mutual understanding. Having said that, all this attention for Muslim women’s garbs is superficial, further confirming the underlying need for a charter of shared beliefs: the solution for all these confrontations on marginal aspects resides in a written agreement between the State and Muslim communities representatives. A significant step in this direction, for instance, was made in Italy in 2005 with the set up of the Islamic Council (Consulta Islamica), gathering delegates from different Muslim organizations, and the subsequent signature of a Charter of the Values of Citizenship and Integration (Carta dei valori della cittadinanza e dell’integrazione) in 2006. Nonetheless, the efficiency of this institutional body has been nullified so far by both unreliable Muslim counterparts and Islamophobic parties. Despite the lack of important achievements, a charter of mutually agreed values remains crucial to any integration in a pre-existing cultural texture. It must also be reminded that the Muslim countries signed a separate Declaration of Human Rights in Islam (1990), thus underlining a different understanding of these rights and the consequent necessity for Muslims to re-negotiate them, when arriving in a non-Muslim country. Whether the niqab is compatible with Europe’s position on inter-gender relationships or not has to be encompassed in a charter of shared beliefs between the State and Muslim representatives. The next step would be a European charter regulating the same aspects, overcoming the State rationale, on the basis of an agreement with the European ‘umma (community of the believers). For sure, an exclusively downward approach, imposing a ban on a feature of Muslim integration, is unlikely to work in the long term and it fails to address the wider complexity of the issue. *Andrea Glioti is finishing a Master in Near and Middle East Studies at SOAS, University of London.